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Tort Law-ASSUMPTION OF RISK-ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE REQUIRES THAT THE DEFENSE OF IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF RISK
BE ELIMINATED AS AN ABSOLUTE BAR TO RECOVERY-Blackburn v.
Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
Assumption of risk is raised as an affirmative defense against a
plaintiff who, aware of a risk created by a defendant's negligence,
nevertheless voluntarily encounters it.' In May, 1977, three consoli-
dated cases tested the viability of the assumption of risk defense as
an absolute bar to recovery in a Florida negligence action.
In Dorta v. Blackburn,' Kevin Blackburn, a minor passenger in a
negligently operated dune buggy, was injured when it overturned.
In Parker v. Maule Industries, Inc.,3 Raymond Parker was injured
in a fall from a negligently operated truck. In Rea v. Leadership
Housing, Inc, 4 Concetta Rea, trying to avoid two holes in her drive-
way which had negligently been left unfilled by the defendant, was
injured falling from her bicycle. 5 In Dorta, the Third District Court
of Appeal reversed judgment for the plaintiff, holding that the de-
fense of assumption of risk remained a bar to recovery notwith-
standing Florida's adoption of the doctrine of comparative negli-
gence.6 In Rea, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, although ac-
knowledging the Dorta decision, reversed summary judgment for
the defendant, finding that "assumption of risk ought to be treated
as a special form of contributory negligence and merged with contri-
butory negligence in light of the adoption of comparative negli-
gence." 7 The court stated that allowing the defense to bar recovery
"is inconsistent with the underlying rationale of loss distribution
in proportion to fault as espoused . . . in Hoffman v. Jones." In
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 440 (4th ed. 1971).
2. 302 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
3. 321 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
4. 312 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
5. Only in Concetta Rea's case did the lower court opinion discuss whether the plaintiffs
exposure was voluntary or the risk known. The court determined that there was a material
issue of fact both as to the issue of a knowing appreciation of the risk and as to the issue of
the voluntariness of exposure to a known risk, since Rea's driveway was the only means of
ingress and egress to her home. Id. at 820.
6. 302 So. 2d 450. The trial judge had refused to instruct the jury on assumption of risk
on the ground that it had been merged into comparative negligence. Id. at 451. In Hoffman
v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), the Florida Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of
comparative negligence.
7. 312 So. 2d at 821 (footnote omitted).
8. Id. at 823, citing Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). In Hoffman, the Florida
Supreme Court noted that its adoption of comparative negligence might effect a change in
the concept of assumption of risk but declined to consider the issue absent a case or contro-
versy. The court pointed out that until the issue was before it, judicial determinations were
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Parker, the First District Court of Appeal adopted the position
taken by the Fourth District in Rea? Reversing the lower court's
Dorta decision'0 the Florida Supreme Court approved Parker and
Rea, holding "that the affirmative defense of implied assumption
of risk is merged into the defense of contributory negligence and the
principles of compative negligence . . . shall apply in all cases
where the defense is asserted."" In so holding, Florida joined other
to be guided by the express purposes for which comparative negligence was adopted: appor-
tionment of fault and apportionment of damages between two negligent parties. 280 So. 2d
at 439. As a guide to trial court judges, the Hoffman court referred to the comparative
negligence case law developed under Florida's Railroad Statute. Id. The statute, enacted in
1887, applied comparative negligence principles to railroad accidents. It was held unconstitu-
tional in Georgia Southern & Florida R.R. v. Seven-up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965),
on grounds that it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of both the federal
and Florida constitutions because it was of limited scope and not of general application. 280
So. 2d at 437. Similar to the Florida Railroad Statute was the 1939 amendment to the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 54, which abolished assumption of risk as a defense to a
negligence action against a common carrier to recover damages for injury or death of an
employee. The 1939 amendment is the subject of an extended discussion in Tiller v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943).
9. 321 So. 2d at 107. Chief Judge Boyer dissented, urging that contributory negligence
and assumption of risk were distinct doctrines requiring separate treatment. He posed the
following hypothetical: a persistent party-goer insists on catching a ride home in the car of a
fellow party-goer, despite being expressly warned that the car's brakes and tires are bad, the
car's driver is weak-eyed and slightly intoxicated, and the roads home are rain-slick and
heavily traveled. Judge Boyer's view was that if the car subsequently crashes because of the
driver's negligence, allowing the persistent party-goer to recover is unjust. Id. at 108. For a
contrary view, see Pedrick, Taken for a Ride: The Automobile Guest and Assumption of Risk,
22 LA. L. REV. 90 (1961). Pedrick deplores the continued validity of assumption of the risk as
a bar to recovery in comparative negligence jurisdictions, particularly when used to deny
recovery to automobile guest plaintiffs. He premises his disapproval on the idea that even if
an intoxicated driver and his equally intoxicated passengers discussed the risks of a drive,
the driver "would encourage all to be of good cheer on the ground that he is insured." Id. at
99. The apparent difficulty with merging assumption of risk into the doctrine of contributory
negligence in automobile guest cases is a misapprehension that without proof that the persist-
ent guest, as in Judge Boyer's hypothetical, is himself causally negligent, a close to total
recovery could result. This notion rests on the assumption that generally a guest's duty is
merely to keep a lookout and to warn. See Kaplan v. Wolff, 198 So. 2d 103, 106 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1967). In apportioning damages, however, the recklessness of a passenger's decision
to go along for a ride will be considered in determining how much he was at fault. The causal
requirement relates to the totality of the passenger's conduct-to what extent his injuries
were caused by his own unreasonable choice. Under this reasoning, Judge Boyer's hypotheti-
cal is less persuasive. For a discussion, see McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
113 N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962). Another commentator, discussing whether in a comparative
negligence jurisdiction an "unreasonable assumption of risk" should constitute a complete
defense, suggests that the better view is that it would not. See James, Assumption of Risk:
Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, n.4 (1968).
Subsequent to the Florida Supreme Court's granting of conflict certiorari in the three cases,
the Second District Court of Appeal, in Hall v. Holton, 330 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1976), followed the Rea and Parker decisions.
10. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977).
11. Id. at 293.
CASE COMMENTS
jurisdictions which have expressed dissatisfaction with the assump-
tion of risk doctrine.'"
According to the Blackburn court, assumption of risk is a catch-
all phrase which defines no concept not already subsumed either
under contributory negligence or the common-law concept of duty.' 3
Because the term historically has been carelessly used,'4 the court,
in analyzing assumption of risk, was confronted with a "potpourri
of labels, concepts, definitions, thoughts, and doctrines."' 5 It broke
into categories the various ideas which assumption of risk has been
used to express. They can be schematically shown as follows:
12. As the Blackburn decision noted, id. at 289 n.3., the following states have indicated
either that assumption of risk should not be pled as a defense or that, if pled, it should be
treated as the equivalent of contributory negligence: Alaska: Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d
61 (Alas. 1968); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572h (1973); New Hampshire: Bolduc
v. Crain, 181 A.2d 641 (N.H. 1962); New Jersey: McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196
A.2d 238 (N.J. 1963); New Mexico: Williamson v. Smith, 491 P.2d 1147 (N.M. 1972); North
Dakota: Wentz v. Deseth, 221 N.W.2d 101 (N.D. 1974); N.D. STAT. 9-10-06 (1973); Utah:
UTAH STAT. 78-27-37 (1975); Wisconsin: McConville v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 113
N.W.2d 14 (Wis. 1962).
The following states, while finding that express assumption of risk is still a viable defense,
have indicated that implied assumption of risk should be treated as equivalent to contribu-
tory negligence: Kansas: Smith v. Blakey, 515 P.2d 1062 (Kan. 1973); Maine: Wilson v.
Gordon, 354 A.2d 398 (Me. 1976); Minnesota: Springrose v. Willmore, 192 N.W.2d 826 (Minn.
1971); Oregon: Zumwalt v. Lindland, 396 P.2d 205 (Ore. 1964); OR. REv. STAT. § 18.470
(1971); Texas: Farley v. M.M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Washington: Lyons
v. Redding Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 821 (Wash. 1973); Wyoming: Sanders v. Pitner, 508 P.2d
602 (Wyo. 1973).
California and Hawaii merge assumption of risk when it overlaps with contributory negli-
gence. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Bulatao v. Kauai Motors Ltd., 406
P.2d 887 (Hawaii 1965).
13. 348 So. 2d at 289 n.2., citing Petrone v. Margolis, 89 A.2d 476, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1952) which found the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence to be
"convertible terms."
14. For a discussion of the historical development of the doctrine, see Bohlen, Voluntary
Assumption of Risk, 20 HARv. L. REv. 14, 91 (1906). The industrial revolution produced a
doctrine governing the master-servant relationship which could be characterized as
"employee beware! "The Blackburn court noted the interests which gave rise to the assump-
tion of risk defense. 348 So. 2d at 292, quoting Tiller v. Atlantic Coast R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68-
69 (1943). The vagaries of historical change undergone by the doctrine of assumption of risk
will not be discussed in this comment.
15. 348 So. 2d at 290.
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Assumption of Risk
Express Implied
(Contractual or actual Primary Secondary
consent to injury) I
l(no duty/no (affirmative
breach of defense to an
dut~V establ ished
breach of
dutyl
unreasonable reasonable
(qualified) (strict or
pure)
Excluding express assumption of risk"6 from its discussion, the
court confined its analysis to distinguishing between primary im-
plied assumption of risk and two categories of secondary implied
assumption of risk." The term primary assumption of risk is a mis-
nomer: the term simply means that the defendant was not negli-
gent. He either owed the plaintiff no duty or did not breach a duty
owed.6 For example, if a man is struck by lightning while waiting
for his train on an open railway platform, his widow could not re-
cover in a wrongful death action against the railroad. Whatever the
duty of care that a railroad owes its passengers, that duty cannot
be stretched to requiring it to protect passengers standing outside
from lightning bolts. Living involves risk. Many injured persons are
16. Id. at 290. Express assumption of risk is a contractual concept whereby the covenantor
agrees not to sue for injury resulting from the convenantee's negligence. The validity of
contractual clauses exculpating the covenantee from liability have limitations. See Keeton,
Assumption of Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61, 63-66 (1965). Also covered under the express
assumption of risk doctrine is voluntary participation in a contact sport. The doctrine ex-
presses the idea that the plaintiff has consented to intentional battery. See Hackbart v.
Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977). The distinction between consent
and assumption of risk usually is grounded upon the distinction between intentional torts and
negligence. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. Rav. 17, 31-33 (1961),
suggests that consent is the proper term when a plaintiff is not only willing that a certain
event occur but desires an invasion of a normally protected interest. Assumption of risk is
the proper term to use when a plaintiff, although willing that a certain event occur, neither
desires the invasion of a normally protected interest nor is substantially certain that the
invasion will result.
17. 348 So. 2d at 290. The labels are widely used judicially and by commentators. See 82
ALR 2d 1218 (1962).
18. 348 So. 2d at 290.
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denied recovery not because they have "assumed" risks but because
there is no one to blame for their injuries; no one has been negligent.
Characterizing the situation above as no-duty or no-duty-
breached by the railroad is both more accurate and less confusing
than terming it primary assumption of risk by the passenger."9 The
Blackburn court pointed out that Florida jury instructions first
cover the plaintiff's burden of proof.2 0 There is no justification for
rephrasing what is a failure of proof by the plaintiff as an assump-
tion of risk by the plaintiff, thus perpetuating a term of dubious
utility. The defendant need not prove his affirmative defense of
secondary implied assumption of risk-the assumption of risk which
the Blackburn decision treated in its holding-if the plaintiff fails
to prove the defendant's negligence.
Despite the distinction which exists between a failure of proof and
a successfully asserted affirmative defense, judges in the past have
couched decisions in terms of a plaintiff having assumed a risk
rather than the plaintiff having failed to prove the defendant negli-
gent." Because assumption of risk barred recovery when success-
fully asserted as an affirmative defense, the ground for decision did
not affect the outcome of those cases. Plaintiffs received nothing for
their injuries and, however careless the judicial analysis, defendants
were not heard to complain.
The Blackburn holding will not change the outcome of a case in
which there is no proof of a defendant's negligence-plaintiffs will
continue to be barred from recovery. The rationale for denying re-
covery, however, should no longer be expressed in terms of the plain-
tiff having assumed risk of injury.
19. Id. at 291, citing McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238 (N.J. 1963).
20. Id.
21. See Rindley v. Goldberg, 297 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). In Rindley, the
plaintiff was struck by the defendant's golf ball. Both women were members of a golf four-
some. The defendant had been verbally guided to her lost ball by the plaintiff who then stood
on the edge of a green some 40-50 feet away and watched the defendant hit her ball toward
that same green. The ball struck the plaintiff, who sued for damages. The defendant's answer
alleged the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. The trial
judge granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed,
concluding that "plaintiff's injury was a result of the certain obvious and ordinary risks of
the sport of golfing which she assumed as a member of a golfing foursome with full knowledge
of the normal dangers of participating therein." Id. at 141. Clearly, the decision expresses the
idea that the defendant had breached no duty owed to the plaintiff. Golf balls are routinely
struck on a golf course. The plaintiff was fully aware of the defendant's actions and the
defendant was under no duty to shout "Fore" or to refrain from striking her ball, since she
reasonably could have believed that the plaintiff would be aware of any danger and take steps
to avoid it. Such foreseeable self-protective measures to reasonably apparent risks reduced
the defendant's conduct to no-duty conduct, or non-negligence. See Mansfield, supra note 6,
at 19.
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The Blackburn holding will appreciably affect the outcome of
cases involving secondary implied assumption of risk, that "thorn
in the judicial side"2 which is the true affirmative defense to an
established breach of duty. Secondary implied assumption of risk
is either reasonable (pure or strict) or unreasonable (qualified) .23 To
illustrate the distinction between the two categories, the Blackburn
court posed the following hypothetical. A tenant, returning from
work, sees his home on fire. The fire is a result of the landlord's
having permitted the premises to become highly flammable, a
breach of a duty owed to the tenant. Inside the house is either (1)
the tenant's baby, or (2) the tenant's fedora. The tenant rushes into
the raging fire and is injured. Certainly one can say he has encoun-
tered a known risk. But his conduct is a reasonable assumption of
that risk if prompted by a desire to save his infant child. His con-
duct is an unreasonable assumption of risk if, instead of his baby,
he was trying to save his hat.24 The court noted that in the first
instance, although a plaintiff technically would be precluded from
recovery because of his voluntary exposure to a known risk, no Flor-
ida case has applied reasonable (pure-strict) implied assumption of
risk to bar recovery and "there is no reason supported by law or
justice in this state to give credence to such a principle of law."2 5
Although the court's example is useful in illustrating the distinction
between strict and qualified assumption of risk, it is arguable
whether the hypothetical plaintiff's conduct in trying to save his
baby is assumption of risk at all. Voluntariness is the crux of the
doctrine-if a plaintiff must choose between two equal evils he can-
not be said to act of his own free will. "Voluntary exposure is the
bedrock upon which the doctrine of assumed risk rests. 26 If the
defendant's negligence puts the plaintiff in the position of being
compelled to choose between two evils, the options which the defen-
dant's negligence present to the plaintiff are not true choices. 2 In
22. 348 So. 2d at 291.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. The general consensus seems to be that in those instances in which it appears that
a plaintiff has reasonably assumed a risk but nonetheless has been barred from recovery, the
cases are generally of the no-duty variety. See Note, 56 MINN. L. Rav. 47 (1971). These are
primary assumption of risk cases. The plaintiff undeniably has been injured but not through
the negligence of the defendant.
26. Bartholf v. Baker. 71 So. 2d 480, 483 (Fla. 1954).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 496E (1965). Comment C states in part:
The plaintiffs acceptance of the risk is not to be regarded as voluntary where the
defendant's tortious conduct has forced upon him a choice of courses of conduct,
which leaves him no reasonable alternative to taking his chances. A defendant who,
by his own wrong, has compelled the plaintiff to choose between two evils cannot
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the example postulated by the Blackburn court, one option required
an affirmative act-rushing into a fire, while the other option con-
sidered of doing nothing-letting the tenant's child perish. If the
tenant had elected to do nothing he would have acted less reasona-
bly than if he had assumed the risk of burns. In such instances,
where the risky choice is the reasonable choice, the defense of as-
sumption of risk is inappropriate.
The Blackburn holding is thus limited to one category embraced
within the general phrase of assumption of risk. The court found
only the affirmative defense of unreasonable (qualified) implied as-
sumption of risk to be conceptually indistinguishable from contribu-
tory negligence.2" The focus of both defenses is on the unreasona-
bleness of the plaintiff's conduct. Contributory negligence is con-
duct by a plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his protection and which contributes as a
legal cause to the harm he suffers.29 Unreasonable (qualified) as-
sumption of risk is conduct whereby the plaintiff makes a wrong
choice in the sense that he acts unreasonably by choosing to encoun-
ter the particular known risk created by the plaintiff's negligence. 3
0
In the 1955 decision of Byers v. Gunn,1 the Florida Supreme Court
attempted to distinguish between the two defenses. Acknowledging
that "[a]t times the line of demarcation ... is difficult to define,"
the court found assumption of risk, unlike contributory negligence,
to involve "a choice made more or less deliberately .... "32 It de-
scribed contributory negligence as "a matter of conduct, ' 3  while
assumption of risk is "a mental condition of willingness. '34
be permitted to say that the plaintiff is barred from recovery because he has made
the choice. Therefore, where the defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff, and his
breach of duty compels the plaintiff to encounter the particular risk in order to
avert other harm to himself, his acceptance of the risk is not voluntary, and he is
not barred from recovery. The same is true where the plaintiff is forced to make
such a choice in order to avert harm to a third person.
28. 348 So. 2d at 291. Although the court's discussion makes clear that it is restricting its
holding to unreasonable assumption of risk (implied-qualified), its concluding paragraphs
pose the issue as being whether liability is equated with fault "under a doctrine which would
bar recovery by one who voluntarily, but reasonably, assumes a known risk." Id. at 293
(emphasis supplied). As the court itself noted earlier, reasonable (pure) assumption of risk
has never barred recovery in Florida. If the plaintiff's conduct is reasonable, his injuries are
not his fault whether one applies contributory negligence or assumption of risk.
29. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 65, at 417, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 463
(1965).
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 68, at 441.
31. 81 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1955).
32. Id. at 727.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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The distinction thus expressed was nebulous indeed since only by
examining conduct could the "mental condition of willingness" be
inferred. After Blackburn, the need to inquire into willingness is
obviated. Regardless of the plaintiff's mental acquiesence, his con-
duct will be judged by whether he failed "to exercise the care of a
reasonably prudent man under similar circumstances," 5 the tradi-
tional standard by which contributory negligence is judged. The
Blackburn court found no sound rationale for retaining as a separate
affirmative defense that form of assumption of risk which can be "so
readily characterized, conceptualized, and verbalized as contribu-
tory negligence .... "I'
Obviously the Blackburn decision will increase the class of plain-
tiffs who, despite proof of unreasonable choices, survive motions for
summary judgment or directed verdicts. Juries will be required to
examine the conduct of two different kinds of plaintiff: a plaintiff
who has voluntarily decided to take his chances is conceptually not
quite the same as one who has failed to exercise the care of a reason-
able man for his own protection. The former has deliberated; the
latter has been inattentive. 7 In apportioning fault, juries will need
to focus on voluntariness and the nature of the choice which was
presented to the plaintiff. For example, if the tenant in the
Blackburn hypothetical had rushed into the burning house to save
an irreplaceable and uninsured painting, his conduct would be less
reasonable than if he were saving his child, yet far more reasonable
than if he were saving his hat. 3 As noted earlier, the element of
voluntariness is usually missing if the defendant's negligence puts
a plaintiff in the position of choosing between two courses, both of
which present a risk of harm to himself or harm to a third person.
Where harm to property is involved, a presumption of voluntariness
may be assumed to be present. The plaintiff should elect to avoid
injury to himself and lose a prized art object rather than elect to risk
35. 348 So. 2d at 291.
36. Id.
37. The distinction is more apparent than real. When a jury can find unreasonable as-
sumption of risk because a plaintiff has actual knowledge, it can also find contributory
negligence-that the plaintiff failed to exercise the care of a prudent man under similar
circumstances. It is immaterial that the reverse is not also true. If the plaintiff has no actual
knowledge, the inquiry will be as to what knowledge he should have had. But once actual
knowledge is shown, then the focus should be on the reasonableness of conduct. Thus, contri-
butory negligence is always present where unreasonable assumption of risk is found. Note,
56 MnqN. L. REV. 47, 60 (1971).
38. The Restatement position, see note 27 supra, suggests that voluntariness is never
found when the plaintiff must choose a risk to avoid harm to himself or a third person.
Choosing a risk to avoid harm to property, while understandable, apparently becomes volun-
tary.
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injury and save the painting. Although one can argue that it is just
as much no-choice if one substitutes the hat or the painting for the
baby, the argument is misleading. The question of whether either
of two courses of action is truly voluntary presupposes hard choices
of equal weight. When only a hat or painting is at stake, the plain-
tiff's course is clear. Theoretically, to choose any property over the
risk of physical injury is an unreasonable choice. But the Blackburn
decision may have the practical result of allowing juries to deter-
mine degrees of unreasonableness. Depending on the value or im-
portance of property at stake, the plaintiff will be more or less
reasonable. A man who risks burns to save an irreplaceable painting
is thus apt to be found at fault for a lesser portion of his injuries than
a man who risks burns to save his hat. To choose to save objects
rather than one's skin may indeed be an unreasonable choice; but,
because plaintiffs should not be placed in the position of having to
make such choices, those plaintiffs who pursue only slightly unrea-
sonable choices are most likely to benefit by the Blackburn decision.
The court makes clear that under comparative negligence no dis-
tinction should be made as a matter of law between two such similar
types of unreasonable conduct as are expressed by the doctrines of
contributory negligence and unreasonable implied assumption of
risk. Under the expressed rationale of Hoffman v. Jones,"5 it is ine-
quitable to allow a defendant who is negligent to escape liability
altogether simply because the defendant's negligence prompted the
plaintiff to make an unreasonable choice. The defendant must in-
stead share the costs of injury with a plaintiff who has assumed
certain risks, just as defendants have shared the costs with plaintiffs
who, failing to exercise the due care expected of a prudent man
under similar circumstances, have been found to be contributorily
negligent. If one accepts the principles of comparative negligence,
one must accept an equality of treatment between both sorts of
plaintiffs.
ALIX THORNTON
39. 280 So. 2d at 437. Comparative negligence "is simply a more equitable system of
determining liability and a more socially desirable method of loss distribution." Id.
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